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The Berkowitz, Burton, and Williams papers ask whether 
costs, prices, or profits in the workers' compensation in 
surance market differ across "regulated states." The market 
is regulated in most states, including those they consider in 
depth: Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York. A central 
question they ask is what role the state (or its regulatory arm) 
plays in the process that generates costs, prices, and profits.
Professor Williams gives an excellent summary and 
description of rate regulation and price determination in 
both the national and regional workers' compensation in 
surance markets. He describes how manual rates are deter 
mined, as well as the adjustments to manual rates that affect 
the price actually paid. He describes the environment in both 
open-competition and prior approval states. He examines 
the underwriting profit and contingency factor, investment 
income and insurance profitability. Professor Williams is 
not judgmental. He is simply scholarly. He reports the pro 
and con arguments for open competition.
I think that given a state workers' compensation law and 
its basic administration, what Professor Berkowitz
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categorized as recordkeeping, monitoring, evaluation, and 
adjudication, the state and its regulatory arm will play little 
role in the price of workers' compensation insurance or the 
profitability of the business. I consider one family of excep 
tions later. First, I present the rationale for my judgment 
that the state plays a limited role.
For over half a century, workers' compensation insurance 
was a stable line. The actuarial estimates of program costs 
were generally on target and the combined ratios predictable. 
But in the early 1970s at least two major events eliminated 
this predictability. One was the impact of inflation. The 
other was structural change in the program, including in 
creased benefits, brought about in part by the National 
Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws 
chaired by Professor Burton. These events made the accurate 
forecasting of losses a more difficult art. Medical costs 
escalated rapidly, as did indemnity claim frequency, and 
perhaps the durations of disability, as both real and nominal 
benefits rose.
As Professor Williams pointed out, writing workers' com 
pensation insurance is a leveraged business. Over the 1970s 
the leverage, the ratio of either net premiums written or 
reserves to statutory capital and surplus or to net worth, also 
increased. Obviously, nominal rates of interest rose with in 
flation, and the nominal investment income earned by in 
surance companies increased with the rise in interest rates 
and leverage. The nominal rate of return required by all in 
dustries to attract and retain capital also rose. As regulators 
and others saw insurers earning increasingly larger amounts 
of nominal investment income, there was increasing pressure 
to have open competition or to include investment income in 
the calculation of manual rates in prior approval states.
The workers' compensation insurance market is 
characterized by intense price and nonprice comptition. The
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market has relatively easy entry (and exit) requirements. The 
capitalization requirements are low in many states and insur 
mountable in none. There are many sellers in the market 
and, although some are large in absolute size, the concentra 
tion ratio (combined market share) of the top four or top 
eight firms is low. Firms actively in the market must compete 
with one another, contend with the threat of firms self- 
insuring and the potential entry of insurers licensed in the 
state but not active in the market. There are many buyers in 
the market, and these buyers are businesses with good 
prepurchase information. The basic coverage sold in the 
market is mandated by law, and although insurers compete 
vigorously on claims handling and safety services, the in 
surance coverage offered by insurance company A is a good 
substitute for that offered by insurance company B.
Insurers compete vigorously on price. They do so at the 
beginning of a policy period, at the end of the period, or 
both. Professor Williams has listed some of the methods in 
surers use to compete. Insurers offer firms cost-plus in 
surance, sliding scale dividend plans (rebate of part of the 
premium based on the safety record of their insured), and 
they alter the time flow of the premium that their insured 
must pay. In virtually all states, the deposit premium rule has 
been waived. This means that an insured and an insurer can 
enter into an agreement to lengthen the time over which the 
insured can pay a fixed nominal insurance premium. For ex 
ample, assume the nominal price of mandated coverage is 
$100. The insurer and insured can agree that this amount will 
be paid in a lump sum today, or in installments over N 
periods. The latter case could include some initial periods of 
zero payment. In effect, there is price flexibility downward. 
Prices will vary with the inflationary and real return expecta 
tions of the parties to the contract. It is difficult to imagine 
excessive profits being earned in markets such as the one 
described above.
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Professor Williams pointed out that some critics argue 
that competition in the workers' compensation insurance 
markets "benefits almost exclusively the larger employers 
who might otherwise self-insure." The argument posed by 
these critics is extremely weak. Firms risk their capital in ex 
pectation that they will receive a market return, which in 
cludes a risk premium. Firms are not prohibited from writing 
insurance business for small risks. Many insurers do so. If 
there is not great downward pressure on prices for the 
business of smaller firms, it is because insurers do not 
evaluate the risk involved in writing this business to be com 
mensurate with the rewards for writing the business. Infor 
mation is available on the loss records of smaller risks (both 
individually and collectively). If insurers thought they would 
earn greater than a market rate of return writing this 
business, they would. Some risks end up in assigned risk 
pools. These firms do not end up in assigned risk pools 
because insurers expect to make too much money writing this 
business. They do not end up in assigned risk pools because 
insurers are charities. They end up in assigned risk pools 
because insurers do not expect to earn a reasonable profit 
writing these risks. Why? Because most states have man 
dated that the nominal price of insurance cannot exceed a 
preset limit. Although there is downward price flexibility, 
prices are not flexible upward. This is one of the exceptions 
that I mentioned earlier regarding the impact of regulation 
on workers' compensation prices.
The state can affect prices and profits by arbitrarily setting 
the price of insurance too low at the beginning of an 
operating period and not allowing upward price ad 
justments. States may also delay the implementation of new 
manual rates. Or regulators may shift interest rate risk to the 
beginning of an operating period, in effect lowering the 
manual rates and hence the ceiling price, and forcing more 
risks from the competitive market. Finally, the state may
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constrain the taste for risk bearing on the part of some in 
surers by requiring them to write business at lower leverage 
than the insurers would desire, or the market would dictate.
Why do workers compensation insurance prices and costs 
vary across states? In large part because of differences in the 
state: law, labor market, industrial composition, cost of liv 
ing and a host of related factors. The benefits paid may dif 
fer over states as a result of variations in state workers' com 
pensation laws and state wage distributions. Workers in a 
state may be willing to bear more risk or to report more in 
juries and file more workers' compensation claims given 
higher insurance benefits. Given different benefit structures 
across states, workers with the same tastes for risk bearing 
may have different accident and claim filing rates. In addi 
tion, with the same level of benefits across states, workers in 
different states, and in particular in different industries and 
occupations, may have different tastes for risk bearing. The 
number of occupational injuries and diseases will be a func 
tion of the industrial composition of a state. If more risky in 
dustries are concentrated in a state, the total cost of workers' 
compensation insurance in that state will be higher. Similar 
ly, if the costs of accident prevention are higher in one state 
than another, all else constant, more injuries will take place 
in the high prevention cost state.
Professor Burton and Mr. Krueger examine the dif 
ferences in costs to employers across states. In their research, 
they control for heterogeneity in the state industrial com 
position. Their paper gives us insight into how much of the 
variation in the costs to employers is due to residual factors, 
including regulation, market conditions, and administration. 
They carefully document the link between the benefits and 
costs of a social insurance system. Although they do not 
stress the point in their paper, their methodology also pro 
vides one way to compare the cost of public versus private
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provision of a social insurance. They close their paper with 
the value judgment, "... New Jersey and New York 
employers had lower workers' compensation costs than did 
Connecticut employers, . . . their achievement seems more 
due to parsimony than prudence." It may be that what Bur 
ton and Krueger chose to call parsimony is simply political 
markets working well.
Monroe Berkowitz poses the basic question, why do some 
states "administer" their programs by letting litigation take 
place, and others by aggressive and interventionist strategies. 
I believe political markets work. New Jersey had high perma 
nent partial claim frequency because it was the political con 
sensus to have it. Property rights and their administration at 
any point in time are reflections of the will of the people (or 
their power block coalitions).
The political market is the mechanism through which 
groups attempt to shift the cost burden of disability. Witness 
the existence of state insurance funds. This same political 
market has given us state systems for compensating perma 
nent partial disability, and all of the headaches that go with 
administering such a system. The market has not yet given us 
a full federal system for compensating for permanent partial 
disability under the social security system. Much of the 
claimed "administrative efficiency" of that federal pro 
gram, and inefficiency of state programs, is actually the 
market at work. And much of the role that I have ascribed to 
the state, including the setting of ceiling prices and leverage 
ratios, is simply that magnificent market at work.
